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the coproduction challenge of working with formal service providers to dispose of the sanitary waste safely; the aﬀordability challenge of
reconciling the aﬀordable with what is acceptable to both users and local authorities; and the tenure challenge of preventing housing
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In this article we examine how two well-documented, relatively successful and longstanding initiatives, the Orangi Pilot Project and an
Alliance of Indian partners, met these challenges. They were met through social innovation, but also through the choice and develop-
ment of sanitation technologies (simpliﬁed sewers for OPP and community toilet blocks for the Indian Alliance) that provided traction
for the social innovations. We also explore more recent eﬀorts by civil society partnerships in four African cities, demonstrating some of
the diﬃculties they have faced in trying to overcome these challenges. No equivalent models have emerged, though there has been
considerable progress against particular challenges in particular places.
These ﬁndings conﬁrm the importance of the challenges, and indicate that these are not just challenges for social organization, but also
for technology design and choice. For example, the problem with household pit latrines is not that they cannot physically be improved to
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Recent research by McGranahan (2015) describes four
institutional challenges to low-cost sanitation: a collective
action challenge, a coproduction challenge, an aﬀordability
challenge, and a housing tenure challenge. These challenges
are held to make it diﬃcult for the conventional institutions
of the ‘‘modern” economy—private property and markets
on the one hand, and the state and bureaucratic processes
on the other—to provide suﬃcient low-cost sanitation.
McGranahan argues that these challenges help to explain
why sanitation often lags behind many other services and
commodities. This paper explores this proposition through
analyzing how two community-driven eﬀorts have managed
to achieve considerable success and sustainability by address-
ing these challenges. Drawing on a recent action-research pro-
ject it also explores the diﬃculties other community-driven
eﬀorts have faced in their attempts to improve sanitation pro-
vision through addressing these challenges. Based on this
research, we argue that while the challenges are fundamentally
institutional in nature, overcoming the challenges depends not
just on social and institutional innovation, but also ﬁnding or
developing technologies that match the institutional challenges
as they are manifested locally.
(a) Simpliﬁed summaries of four institutional challenges
commonly facing sanitation-deprived urban communities
This short summary of the challenges is based on
McGranahan (2015), which also situates these challenges
within the relevant literature.307(i) The local collective action challenge
A person’s sanitation problems depend in large part on the
sanitation facilities and behaviors of others, and if everyone
behaves in narrowly self-interested ways, sanitation will be
far worse that what would emerge from eﬃcient and eﬀective
cooperation or collective action. Suppose you live in a settle-
ment where there is open defecation, where latrines ﬂood onto
the pathways in the rainy season or contaminate local wells,
and where people do not wash their hand after defecating. If
you act alone it makes little diﬀerence to the sanitation prob-
lems you face. If those exposed to local sanitation deﬁciencies
act collectively, rather than pursuing individual self-interest
independently, all can beneﬁt. But orchestrating this is a chal-
lenge. Markets will not supply adequate sanitation, and this is
often taken as evidence of the need for state regulation or pro-
vision (to avoid what was described in Winters, Karim, &
Martawardaya, 2014, as a ‘‘tragedy of the commons”). More
local collective action can also make a diﬀerence, and is espe-
cially important where state-based solutions are not available
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pioneering work on collective action and the emergence of
social norms, the challenge of collective action can take many
forms, and even for sanitation it varies with the technology as
well as the social, economic, and political context.
(ii) The coproduction challenge
The coproduction challenge is especially evident with low-
cost on-site sanitation. The state (or a utility) and the residents
(or their organizations) need to collaborate in producing better
sanitation, partly because neither can do it alone and partly
because collaboration enhances mutual accountability. By
coproduction we mean ‘‘a process through which inputs from
individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organization are trans-
formed into goods and services” (Ostrom quoted in
McGranahan, 2015, p. 245). In this paper the speciﬁc focus is
on collaboration between the residents of informal settlements
and public agencies. Local residents cannot be expected to take
responsibility for the ultimate treatment of the fecal sludge, and
even if working collectively they have little incentive to do so
beyond the borders of their neighborhood. In eﬀect, even if
neighborhoods address their own collective action problem, in
the absence of onsite recycling the temptation will be to dump
or drain the waste out of the neighborhood creating a second
order collective action problem. A more centralized public orga-
nization is critical for managing the ultimate disposal or recy-
cling of the waste. But such an organization cannot be
expected to manage individual latrines, and experience suggests
they cannot manage toilet blocks or other low-cost facilities at a
reasonable cost. The use of regulations to enforce improvements
in low-income settlements is also problematic (as described
under aﬀordability below). This leaves coproduction as the obvi-
ous, but by no means easy, option.
(iii) The aﬀordability challenge
There is a simple economic aﬀordability challenge: for those
with unacceptably low incomes, acceptable sanitation is unaf-
fordable. But this applies to almost all commodities, and this
paper is concerned with how the aﬀordability of sanitation
becomes a social and institutional challenge (for an insightful
review of the diﬃculties even with estimating the value of
sanitation improvements see Whittington, Jeuland, Barker,
& Yuen, 2012). In low-income settings is that neither the state
nor the market is in a good position to decide what is aﬀordable
to whom, and even community organizations have diﬃculty
eliciting this. The state is almost inevitably involved in setting
standards for sanitation (whether these are followed or not),
and often partially subsidizes some forms of sanitation. Unfor-
tunately, where poverty is pervasive, eﬀorts to enforce standards
of sanitation that everyone can agree are acceptable can lead to
the authorized sanitation options being unaﬀordable to many,
even with any subsidies made available. Low-income house-
holds can face disheartening diﬃculties if their eﬀorts at
improved sanitation are penalized because they contravene stan-
dards. The challenge is to negotiate costs down without sacri-
ﬁcing unnecessarily on quality, in a context where the
collective action and coproduction challenges combine with
the house tenure challenge to complicate such negotiation.
(iv) The house tenure challenge
House tenure relates to a complex set of challenges whose res-
olution lies beyond the normal responsibilities of the water and
sanitation sector, but which can undermine eﬀorts to improve
sanitation. Many low-income urban dwellers live in settlements
where land ownership, or at least the way it is being used, is
disputed. Fear of being displaced is a disincentive to investingin things like sanitation facilities that will have to be left behind.
Utilities, whether privately or publically run, often avoid
signiﬁcant investments such as sewage networks in settlements
with insecure tenure; hence the costs of household solutions
may rise. Moreover, tenants have little reason to invest in
sanitation facilities, and sanitation can easily become a matter
of dispute between owners and tenants. Residents may have
an incentive to invest if this will enable the settlement to be
regularized, but taking advantage of such opportunities is
complicated. . .
(b) Overview of the main body of this article
Through the lenses of the four institutional challenges, the
main body of this article examines three community-led eﬀorts
to improve sanitation. The ﬁrst, misleadingly named the
Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), started out in the 1980s as an
exploratory engagement with the residents of one of the
world’s biggest informal settlements, and has since trans-
formed the sanitation situation in Karachi, and still operates
today. The second is the work of the Indian Alliance that
brought together the Indian National Slum Dwellers’ Federa-
tion (NSDF), a women’s network initiated by pavement dwell-
ers (Mahila Milan) and an NGO called the Society for the
Promotion of Resource Centres (SPARC). Their sanitation
work began in Mumbai in the late 1980s, and also persists
to this day, having spread to other cities and become closely
integrated with large-scale government programs.
The third example is more recent and involves the work of
Alliances of Federations of the Urban Poor and their support
NGOs in the urban centers of Blantyre (Malawi), Chinhoyi
(Zimbabwe), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Kitwe (Zambia).
These Alliances, all of which are aﬃliates of Shack/Slum
Dweller International (SDI), have been involved in a three-
year program of action-research supported by the SHARE con-
sortium (http://www.shareresearch.org/), referred to here as the
Four Cities Sanitation Project (FCSP). All had previously been
involved in eﬀorts to improve sanitation in informal settlements,
but the action-research gave them the opportunities to think and
act on sanitation more strategically and at the city-scale. These
Alliances have learned from the work of both the OPP and the
Indian Alliance, which was itself a founding member of SDI
(described in more detail below). The action-research project
has used the four challenges as a learning framework to advance
improved access to sanitation.
For OPP and the Indian Alliance, we show how their suc-
cess in addressing the four challenges helped them to sustain
the work over a long period and assist more than 100,000
households to secure sanitation improvements, and to achieve
an inﬂuence at the city and national levels. Both eﬀorts
involved concerted attempts to organize community members
so that their common demands could be articulated and acted
on collectively. Both eventually managed to secure political
and practical support from local authorities, leading to the
eﬀective coproduction of sanitary improvement. Both adopted
technologies that not only matched their approaches to collec-
tive action and coproduction, but were more aﬀordable, if oﬃ-
cially less acceptable, than conventional sanitation
technologies. And both used sanitation to achieve greater
legitimacy and tenure security for the residents. Their suc-
cesses were not complete and this article is not meant to be
an evaluation of institutional performance generally, but an
attempt to demonstrate that their ability to meet these chal-
lenges helps to explain the success in the ﬁeld of sanitation.
Through this analysis we demonstrate the value of the frame-
work presented in McGranahan (2015).
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against all of the challenges, but much still remains to be
achieved. For example, SDI mobilization and organization
has helped in motivating people to improve their sanitation.
Documentation on the sanitation problems and engagement
with local authorities have opened up possibilities for collabo-
ration (and potentially coproduction). Innovative loans,
success in getting some authorities to accept unconventional
technologies, and redesigning technologies to bring costs down
have eased the aﬀordability challenge. And negotiations with
landlords have helped to overcome the housing tenure
challenge. However, simple pit latrines are still the most preva-
lent low-cost solution, but are poorly suited to community
action or coproduction with local authorities or utilities.
Despite the variety of technological and institutional options,
there are no obvious models of success that can clearly be
reproduced at scale without a level of subsidy authorities can-
not or at least have not provided.
In summary, we argue that the challenges presented in the
earlier framework can indeed be central to securing low-cost
sanitation, and that the framework is of value in understand-
ing success. But we show that simply understanding the frame-
work is not suﬃcient to secure sanitation. These are complex
challenges that depend on the institutional approaches, the
sanitation technologies, and how they operate together. In
both Pakistan and India, each of the challenges has been over-
come through multiple and varied eﬀorts, and in both cases
the technologies suited the forms of local collective action
and coproduction that they developed, despite their low cost.
In the case of the FCSP, the challenges are still daunting, and
the more aﬀordable and locally adapted technologies are not
generally conducive to overcoming the collective action,
coproduction, and tenure challenges. Moreover, with little
scope for subsidies, the possibilities for matching technological
and social innovation is limited. Progress has been made, and
hopeful precedents have been set, but without technological or
political transformation it remains diﬃcult to see the basis for
extending basic sanitation to everyone in these cities by 2030,
the target year in the current draft of the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (United Nations, 2015).
(c) Methodology
This paper draws on diverse methodologies. The analysis of
OPP and Indian Alliance case studies draws on earlier research
projects that both authors have been involved in and a more
longstanding exposure to and engagement with the work of
these agencies that is, in methodological terms, close to political
ethnography (Auyero, 2006). SDI is a transnational network of
national federations of savings groups located primarily in
urban informal settlements in the Global South (see Section 4
below). Both authors have previously collaborated with SDI
and are familiar with the approaches. SDI agreed to participate
in the SHARE research consortium to gain structured knowl-
edge on how the deﬁcit in urban sanitation in sub-Saharan
Africa could be addressed. For SHARE and the authors, the
beneﬁt of collaboration lay in drawing on the knowledge and
perspectives of organizations of the urban poor. SHARE focus
countries included Malawi and Tanzania and it was agreed that
Zambia and Zimbabwe aﬃliates would be invited to participate
to broaden the research base. Cities were selected by aﬃliates in
consultation with the SHARE research team and SDI staﬀ. The
action component within the project included community map-
ping of sanitation needs, sanitation precedents and relation-
building activities between organized residents and relevant
authorities. Data were collected by SDI aﬃliates based onresearch frameworks that were collaboratively designed. Addi-
tional data were secured directly by the authors and other
researchers through regular meetings, in-depth interviews and
participant observation.2. THE ORANGI PILOT PROJECT AND ITS SIMPLI-
FIED SEWERS
The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) was started in 1980 by Dr.
Akhtar Hameed Kahn, a well-known Pakistani practitioner
and thinker, whose austere ways of living and working still
imbue the organization (for summaries of the development
of the project see: Hasan, 2010; Pervaiz, Rahman, & Hasan,
2008; Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2014). It began as an action
research and extension project in Orangi, which was then Kar-
achi’s largest katchi abadi or informal settlement. In the course
of an extended dialog with residents and others, sanitation
emerged as a key issue. The low-cost sanitation program that
was developed provided technical and organizational support
for residents to build a sanitary latrine in each house, an
underground sewer in each lane, and a collector sewer in each
neighborhood, this last feeding into a trunk sewer provided by
the state. This ﬁnal stage was only reached some years after
the start of the program.
By August 2012, the OPP’s approach to sanitation had been
adopted by over 90% of Orangi’s informal housing, or about
107,000 households (Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2014). Moreover,
the approach spread to most other informal settlements in
Karachi, and to many other cities in Pakistan and beyond.
There is considerable overlap between the four challenges
discussed in this paper and the four barriers preventing
improvements by communities identiﬁed by the OPP in the
early 1980s (Pervaiz et al., 2008, p. 58):
1. The social barrier of lacking the community organiza-
tion to engage in collective action.
2. The psychological barrier of thinking that improved
sanitary facilities should and will be given to them by the
government.
3. The economic barrier of not being able to aﬀord to cover
the costs of conventional sanitation facilities.
4. The technical barrier of not having access to the techni-
cal support needed to develop aﬀordable sanitation systems
of reasonable quality.
The social barrier is related to the collective action chal-
lenge, the psychological barrier is at least tangentially related
to the coproduction challenge, and the economic barrier is
related to the aﬀordability challenge (we have deﬁned the
aﬀordability challenge in less narrowly economic terms, but
it should be noted that the OPP barrier is not that they are
unable to aﬀord adequate or improved sanitation but that they
are not able to aﬀord conventional sanitation).
(a) OPP and the collective action challenge
The lane, with its 20–40 households, its lane managers, and
its sewer, has been the critical unit of local collective action
achieved through OPP (Hasan, 2008, 2010; Pervaiz et al.,
2008). The organized lane and its sewer represent the coming
together of neighboring households to take control of the
problems in their street, moving out of the private sphere into
the public. Lane organizations enabled people to shift from
individual to collective decision-making, and tap their full
demand for improved sanitation, hidden when people were
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own narrow self-interest.
The OPP model eventually developed around a nested set of
collective action levels, each with associated technologies: the
household and its toilet, the lane and its lane sewer, the neigh-
borhood and its collector sewer, and the public at large and its
state-provided trunk sewer. Each level organized diﬀerently,
and the environmental health externalities are only avoided
if each level plays its part. If the state did not provide the trunk
sewer, the collector sewer would pollute the city, if the
neighborhood did not provide the collector sewer the lane
sewer would pollute the neighborhood, and if the lane did
not provide their sewer the household’s sewage would pollute
the lane. There were still incentives to free-ride, and for exam-
ple for individual lane residents to avoid contributing to the
construction and maintenance of the lane sewers, but everyone
was under pressure to agree to contribute to the construction,
and once the drains were in place the basis for monitoring and
enforcing cooperation was organizationally relatively straight-
forward.
OPP attempted to initiate collective action by holding public
meetings in the lanes, discussing sanitation conditions in
detail, and indicating that if a lane organization was formed
and appointed lane managers, then OPP staﬀ would provide
technical support. The technical support included surveying
the lane, mapping and costing the work, demarcating the posi-
tion of the drain, providing tools, and overseeing the entire
execution—but not handling the ﬁnance, which was done by
a lane manager and lane committees. The lanes OPP ﬁrst
engaged with were those near natural drainage channels to
which sewage could be diverted. As the process spread, OPP
identiﬁed the need for collector drains. When the local govern-
ment refused to fund these, confederations of lanes were
formed to ﬁnance and build them. In some cases, waste des-
cended into other neighborhoods until the government took
action. Many lanes also organized themselves spontaneously,
having seen others succeed.
OPP’s support for community organization changed over
time. OPP did not intervene directly in the lane organization
or related disputes. Also, while the organization of the lanes
was critical, and played an analogous role to triggering within
Community Led Total Sanitation (Kar, 2008), higher levels of
collective action were encouraged. Not only were the
confederations of lanes formed to deal with neighborhood-
wide coordination and negotiation, but when city-wide issues
arose there was collective action at this level too. Thus, in
resisting a large loan-ﬁnanced sewerage project proposed for
Korangi (another area of Karachi), with US$70 million from
the Asian Development Bank, over 20 public fora were orga-
nized, with large numbers actors involved (Pervaiz et al., 2008,
p. 33). OPP staﬀ supported an Urban Resource Centre to
strengthen the organizations of informal settlement residents
across the city, and enhance their ability to engage successfully
with both government and the broader constituency of profes-
sionals working in Karachi (Anwar, 2011; Urban Resource
Centre, 1994). This can be viewed as involving a loose form
of collective action, but has also contributed to co-production.
(b) OPP and the coproduction challenge
Relations between OPP and the government changed over
the years and with it the forms of coproduction. Coproduction
is implicit in OPP’s guiding principle of ‘‘component sharing”,
which is how OPP describe their system whereby local resi-
dents are responsible for the internal development up to the
trunk sewer that is the responsibility of the state. The extentto which the OPP approach has melded with the practices of
public providers in Karachi has been exceptional. OPP fos-
tered a system in which local residents became willing to take
on responsibilities oﬃcially borne by the public providers, but
also more eﬀective in getting these public providers to deliver
on their remaining responsibilities. OPP made public agencies
aware of the informal sanitation systems of the residents, help-
ing to map them in detail, eventually for all of Karachi. This
information had not been collected by government institutions
because they had presumed the informal systems did not mat-
ter, and that there was no scope for coproduction.
In Ostrom’s seminal article introducing the concept of
coproduction to development studies (Ostrom, 1996), one of
her leading examples was of condominial sewers in Brazil,
with many similarities to the simpliﬁed sewers used by OPP.
In both cases local residents had to cooperate, act collectively,
and coproduce their sanitary improvements, eventually with
the public providers as partners. In Orangi, however, the local
government contributions came relatively late in the process,
and changes within the community were the driving force.
By organizing to work collectively in the lanes, the residents
both encroached on public space and engaged with the public
sector. It was this engagement that eventually made the public
providers more accountable to the low-income residents.
However, the physical properties of sanitary burdens helped
ensure the public sector coproduced improvements, once local
residents were getting their waste out of the neighborhoods.
The state could ignore insanitary public spaces so long as these
were conﬁned to low-income settlements. Once sewage was
ﬂowing into adjoining parts of the city it was indisputably a
state responsibility. The state could persist in blaming OPP
and residents, but it eventually addressed the challenge in a
constructive manner, probably because the costs of inaction
rose while the costs of coproduction fell. These same charac-
teristics made sanitation an appropriate area of work for an
organization like OPP. With technical support, local collective
action could yield large and visible beneﬁts, and OPP could
contribute while strengthening rather than replacing local
organization. Simultaneously, coproduction provided a route
to scaling up the community engagement to city-wide and
eventually national interventions.
(c) OPP and the aﬀordability challenge
One of the core principles of OPP’s sanitation work has
been to help people achieve the sanitation that they can
aﬀord—which is not necessarily the sanitation they want or
deserve. Prior to OPP’s sanitation work, there was the
perception in Orangi, apparently encouraged by ‘‘land grab-
bers” and agents who had developed the settlement, that more
aﬄuent areas received sanitation services for free. Local oﬃ-
cials responded that the aﬄuent paid for their sanitation
through their high development charges, which Orangi resi-
dents could not aﬀord.
One of the ﬁrst tasks OPP faced was to develop a signiﬁcant
improvement in local sanitary conditions, while keeping costs
down. They worked backward, starting with what people
could aﬀord, and modifying engineering standards to reduce
costs to this level. It worked, if not in a ﬁrst iteration, then
in a second or third. OPP drew the lesson that local authority
engineering standards may be friendly to contractors, but not
to low-income communities.
To keep costs low, the underground sewer system was
designed to take advantage of, rather than replace, the natural
channels. Whenever possible drainage work already in place
was also incorporated. OPP’s own overheads were kept low:
LEARNING FROM SUSTAINED SUCCESS 311its salary structure was kept in line with local rates, and volun-
teerism and self-help principles were applied. The materials
and construction costs for the lane and collector sewers were
not subsidized, but training and trunk sewers were provided
free, creating the basis for coproduction. The cost per house-
hold for the sewer in the lane, the house connection and the
sanitary latrine pan worked out at between US$ 15–50 in
recent decades. For the collector sewer, cost varies
considerably depending on the length of the sewer but is gen-
erally less than $5 for each household (Hasan, 2008;
Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2014).
OPP has agitated against large-scale and costly sewerage
projects when the public sector has been planning them. Thus,
OPP has tried to address the aﬀordability project within the
design and operations of the low-cost sanitation system,
within their own operations, and even with the operations of
the public provider. Their diagnosis is that the failure to pur-
sue aﬀordability undermines sustainability and scalability.
(d) OPP and the house tenure challenge
Within OPP, sanitation was conceived of as part of the res-
idents’ broader shelter and settlement-related problems. The
goal of gaining secure tenure cut across all of OPP’s activities.
This has been viewed as more than just secure ownership of
land, and to include recognition for the settlements and their
informal components.
Tenure security in the katchi abadi of Karachi has depended
on the scope for regularizing the settlement. This is inﬂuenced
by adherence to planning regulations. Bad sanitation tends to
make for bad politics, and also for regulatory problems.
Working together outside the home to address the settlement’s
collective sanitation problems, and extending this to copro-
duction with local authorities, was an important means of
improving the formal acceptance of people’s private homes.
The OPP approach to sanitation is probably best known
internationally for its mapping and component sharing. By
making the informal sanitation system more visible and, once
the local authorities were using the maps themselves, more
accepted by the authorities, the simpliﬁed sewer system also
improved the residents’ house security (Hasan, 2009).3. THE INDIAN ALLIANCE AND ITS COMMUNITY
TOILET BLOCKS
The Indian Alliance partnered a predominantly male
national organization of slum dwellers (NSDF), a female
collective built around savings groups (Mahila Milan), and a
professional but unconventional NGO (the Society for the
Promotion of Area Resource Centres—SPARC). This
Alliance brought together NSDF’s political savvy, SPARC’s
professional knowledge, and Mahila Milan’s community
organization—initially in Mumbai. It has been presented by
academics in such diverse guises as a radical new approach
to deepening democracy (Appadurai, 2001) and a manifesta-
tion of edgy urban entrepreneurialism in the slums
(McFarlane, 2012). It has also been critiqued for being too
close to government (Roy, 2009; Ze´rah, 2009) and we return
to this in the section on coproduction.
Sanitation was a concern of these organizations before they
partnered. NSDF had been involved in demanding more and
better-maintained latrines from politicians and public agencies.
SPARC staﬀ had been engaged with women’s community orga-
nizations around sanitation-related issues like worms in chil-
dren. The early pavement dwellers of Mahila Milan hadparticularly serious sanitation problems. In early discussions
of the Alliance, securing permanent housing was the over-
arching concern for the women pavement dwellers, but the need
for sanitation emerged as an immediate priority, and became
central to their organizing strategy (Burra, Patel, & Kerr,
2003; Patel et al., 2015 draft; Patel & The SPARC Team, 2015).
From the Alliance’s ﬁrst community toilet block, built on P
D’Mello Road in Mumbai, the Alliance’s approach broke with
the municipality’s approach to toilet blocks. For the ﬁrst time
the municipality commissioned a collective of low-income
residents to build a municipal toilet not for the public in gen-
eral but for a speciﬁc pavement community. Local residents
contributed to the design, working with professionals identi-
ﬁed by SPARC. Mahila Milan women and other community
members contributed unskilled labor. When completed, the
Alliance deliberately sought media attention with a ‘‘toilet cel-
ebration”.
Following P D’Mello toilet’s success, the Alliance worked to
convince local authorities to provide oﬃcial sanction for com-
munity toilets, remove regulatory barriers, and to help ﬁnd
land to build on and ﬁnance for construction. Many early
community toilets in other parts of Mumbai were ﬁnanced
with development assistance (Patel et al., 2015 draft), and gov-
ernment funding did not ﬂow for some years. One of the ear-
liest government responses was in Pune in 1998, where a
commissioner developed a sanitation program with the munic-
ipality covering capital costs, land, water and electricity, and
the Alliance (or other NGOs and communities) designing,
constructing, and maintaining the toilets (Burra, 2005). Since,
there have been many more opportunities in these and other
cities, though not always as collaborative as in Pune.
In Mumbai, government funding is now available and the
Alliance has been building community capacities to take
advantage of these resources for community toilet blocks.
Scale has been achieved: there have been approximately
1,000 toilet blocks built by the Alliance, with almost 20,000
seats, and getting on for a million users—roughly half in the
Mumbai Metropolitan Region. The Indian Alliance helped
to shape as well as contributing to the Mumbai Sewerage Dis-
posal Project and the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Abhiyan
universal sanitation programs. Staﬀ have joined the task force
that crafted India’s national sanitation policy, announced by
the Government of India in 2008 and the director has been
a member of the National Advisory Group on Sanitation.
The Indian Alliance’s approach to sanitary improvement
worked implicitly to address the four challenges. They put
the community residents and local organization at the center
of the initiative (addressing the collective action challenge),
secured contributions from the government (developing a
coproductive relationship), innovated with communal block
latrines (prioritizing aﬀordability) and used toilet construction
alongside other development eﬀorts to change the negative
imagery toward informal settlements and their residents
(intended to improve housing security).
(a) The Indian Alliance and the collective action challenge
For the Indian Alliance, working with community toilet
blocks was initially as much about increasing collective capac-
ities within the communities as improving sanitary conditions.
In words of the SPARC team:
These toilets provided an important practical focus for the federating prin-
ciples of the Alliance. A community toilet-building program gives a big
push to communities to undertake projects. It creates the space for experi-
mentation and allows for mistakes to be made and learning to happen.
When poor communities in Mumbai and other cities around India
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lets, it was a change in roles. They were no longer supplicants, begging the
city for services. They were able to invite city ofﬁcials to come and inspect
what they had done. They owned the process, and they were the ones telling
the city how they would like it to move.
[Patel & The SPARC Team, 2015]
The choice of ‘‘communal” toilet blocks matches the
collective nature of the problem with a collective response.
Ideally, community-based organizations become the local
agents of change, helping in the design, choosing the location,
and setting the membership fee. SPARC provides technical
and legal support, but on the ground it is networks of Mahila
Milan and NSDF that deliver. The focus has been on inner-
city settlements where individual dwellings are not large
enough for toilets, but the community scale helps the residents
combine their individual demands for sanitation improve-
ments (which, being for a public good, are largely ineﬀectual
on the market) into a collective demand for a cleaner and
healthier and safer neighborhood.
In terms of their implications for collective solidarity, pride
and action, the Indian Alliance contrast public and commu-
nity toilets. Public toilets are built for anyone and owned by
no-one. A community toilet is held in common by a well-
deﬁned group of people. A high-quality community toilet
reﬂects a high-quality community. ‘‘Within the murky politics
of land and tenure in Indian cities, the construction of a com-
munity toilet can be a powerful manoeuvre, especially if it is
built by the community itself” (Burra et al., 2003).
Successful toilets provide evidence to other communities
that local collective action can make a diﬀerence. Mahila
Milan and NSDF support the sharing lessons among diﬀerent
neighborhoods and cities, and for engaging in higher level
collective action. Within the community, the toilets are
matched with other activities and structures that bring groups
together, such as savings groups, which can in turn help run
the toilet.
The community action associated with the toilets is some-
times made visible by placing a community meeting room
on top or adjoining the toilet. This provides both a commu-
nity venue and an incentive for ensuring the toilets are kept
clean. This incentive is ampliﬁed when the toilets are man-
aged by a caretaker who also lives in the immediate vicinity,
and the toilets are located in central and visible locations,
rather than being tucked away out of sight. Even adopting
these strategies, achieving eﬀective collective action has
proved to be diﬃcult, but suﬃciently successful for the Alli-
ance to persist.
(b) The Indian Alliance and the coproduction challenge
The Indian Alliance’s work on community sanitation was a
radical departure from the conventional government approach
to sanitary provision and involved coproduction from the
start. One of the major problems the Indian Alliance had iden-
tiﬁed in dialog with communities and government oﬃcials was
that existing programs did not match what under-serviced
communities wanted or needed (Patel et al., 2015 draft).
Government funding was insuﬃcient for sewered toilets except
to a small minority, and alternatives such as public toilet
blocks were inappropriately located, poorly designed and
badly managed. The more technical side of the Alliance’s push
for coproduction has been expressed in terms of a simple
metaphor of big pipes and little pipes:
``Only the city can handle these big pipe items, which involve politics and big
budgets. Toilets and drainage lines, on the other hand, are genuine little pipe
items and don't really require the city at all. They can be planned, installed andmaintained locally, by communities. The federations propose a sort of deal to
cities: stop wasting money and effort on the little pipe items that slum com-
munities can handle themselves, and concentrate on the big-pipe items like
expanding the sewerage and water-supply grids, that they can’t.”
[Patel et al., 2015 draft]
The Indian Alliance claims that the unserved local residents
need to be at the very center of local sanitary improvement,
and drive the process, planning, managing, and constructing
toilets. The local state is needed to provide linking infrastruc-
ture, legal permissions, and capital funds to enable the scaling
up of local initiatives. This model under-pins the Alliance’s
approach. With support from the Indian Alliance, communi-
ties assess sanitary conditions, and use surveys and meetings
to elicit and measure the collective demand for toilets. They
locate sites where toilets can be constructed, and form local
committees to oversee design, planning, construction, and ulti-
mately the maintenance of the toilet. They approach the rele-
vant authorities for permissions and negotiate arrangements
under which municipalities pay for capital costs. Community
involvement helps ensure that provisioning matches commu-
nity needs, that there is transparency and accountability in
the funding, and that the facilities and services are maintained.
The government ﬁnances capital costs, provides extra-
settlement disposal infrastructure and services, and ensures
that the improvements can be accepted by oﬃcialdom.
The Indian Alliance’s strategic engagement ﬁts at least
roughly with Albrecht’s presentation of coproduction as a chal-
lenge to traditional planning, that ‘‘provides an interaction
between the delivery of public goods (plans, policies, projects)
and building strong, resilient, mutually supportive communi-
ties” (Albrechts, 2013). The ‘‘deep democracy” (Appadurai,
2001) may be weakened in some cases by co-option (Roy,
2009), but the experiences discussed here demonstrate the poten-
tial of sanitation for radically transforming relations between
the state and its more deprived urban citizens.
Coproduction in the provision of basic services necessarily
involves civil society engagement with the state in a range of
negotiations, and the risk that co-option will occur has to be
taken seriously (in part because it can be diﬃcult to distinguish
co-optation from non-co-optive coproduction). The beneﬁts
for democracy of civil society embeddedness are such that
coproduction continues to be seen as relevant to democracy
and development despite these risks (Evans, 2013), but that
does not mean that beneﬁts should be assumed. In the case
of the Indian Alliance and sanitation, we are conﬁdent that
there have been changes in the state’s position on toilet subsi-
dies resulting in substantive ﬁnancial redistribution and the
reform of procedures in response to community designs and
explicit preferences. Moreover, SPARC has taken a public
position of opposition to government plans for the redevelop-
ment of Dharavi (Weinstein, 2014) showing that, at least for
this agency in their work in Mumbai, collaboration can take
place alongside a more confrontational position.
(c) The Indian Alliance and the aﬀordability challenge
If a toilet is shared by two or more households it cannot be
considered ‘‘improved”, according to the deﬁnition used by
the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program on Water
and Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF, 2014a). There has been
a proposal to change this criterion so that it will only exclude
toilets shared by more than ﬁve families (WHO & UNICEF,
2014b), but this would still exclude the community toilet
blocks the Alliance has pioneered. This exclusion may be a
warranted as a crude rule of thumb: the majority of toilet
blocks are poorly managed. However, community toilet
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poorly managed latrines shared by a few households (see
Mara, 2016, who develops the case for such systems, drawing
on the experience of the Indian Alliance).
The Indian Alliance holds that toilet blocks are often the best
option in conditions of extreme poverty in high-density settle-
ments, provided they are restricted to the community living
close-by, who is willing to maintain them well and share the
costs fairly. For a house that is less than 250 ft2 without running
water, drainage or sewerage, there are hygienic, practical, and
often cultural reasons for not having a low-cost toilet in the
house. Furthermore, by taking on community toilets, the Alli-
ance found that sanitation access could reach the bottom
30%, who could not aﬀord individual toilets. In short, in this
context, community toilets can be an important step forward,
though they may still reﬂect unacceptable poverty.
The toilets built with support from the Alliance cost roughly
US$600 per seat, or US$12 per person assuming 50 people per
toilet. Wherever possible the capital costs have been covered
by government. The membership charges of about US$1 per
month per family for unlimited use are considerably less than
families would have to pay for the prevailing pay-per-use toilets.
The Indian Alliance toilets are designed to be aﬀordable, but
include key features prioritized by users. Some of the popular
innovations include separate doors and queues for men and
women, children’s toilets, easily accessible toilets for those
with special needs, two-way swing doors to improve personal
safety, a bathing place and a room for the caretaker. The
meeting room can be rented out for additional income and
improved aﬀordability. In practice there is considerable varia-
tion in the quality of the toilets, risks of violence against
women can be particularly diﬃcult to address, and all other
things equal private solutions would be preferred—but it is
hard to see how this can be achieved in the face of the existing
aﬀordability constraints.
(d) The Indian Alliance and the house tenure challenge
The community sanitation eﬀorts of the Indian Alliance
emerged in discussions with women pavement dwellers in Mum-
bai ‘‘exploring the larger challenge of secure permanent housing”
(Patel et al., 2015 draft). The Alliance saw sanitary improvement
as a stepping stone toward comprehensive upgrading of settle-
ments and recognition of their residents, collectively as well as
individually. When a community achieves better sanitation it
can, in the right circumstances, use this to gain legitimacy,
improve tenure security, and build the sort of social capital that
drives more improvements. The Alliance uses communal toilet
blocks to challenge anti-poor attitudes through celebrating their
opening at toilet festivals (or sandas mela) (Appadurai, 2001).
Managed well, the community toilet blocks avoid some of
the perverse outcomes that can result when the state subsidizes
private toilets built by landlords, and the institutional disin-
centives that tenants face investing in sanitary improvements.
Such actions will often be accompanied by rent hikes, which
can force out existing tenants. Low-cost community facilities
can also lead to higher rental values, but the eﬀect is less,
and there is more scope for addressing intra-community diﬀer-
ences in ability to pay.
Even with government-led attempts to secure land for the
latrines, tenure problems sometimes arose. Indeed, a number
of the community toilets that the Alliance was commissioned
to supply by municipalities were canceled due to tenure issues:
‘‘Land ownership in most of the slums was unclear in city
records. When the work orders were given, many private
landowners, or even public landowners, challenged the rightof the municipality to proceed, and many cases went to court”
(Patel et al., 2015 draft). As this example indicates, the tenure
situation is far more complicated than a simple case of infor-
mal settlements whose structure owners do not own the land.4. LEARNING TO OVERCOME THE SANITATION
CHALLENGES IN THE INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS
OF BLANTYRE, CHINHOYI, DAR ES SALAAM AND
KITWE
This sub-section focuses on how Shack/Slum Dwellers
International (SDI) aﬃliates in aforementioned cities have
responded, explicitly or implicitly, to the challenges of collec-
tive action, coproduction, aﬀordability and tenure (for back-
ground see Banana et al., 2015). This section examines
attempts by groups with a more limited experience in sanita-
tion, seeking out new solutions in diverse locations under a
single project. The project had three phases each lasting about
a year. The ﬁrst included a situational assessment involving
community-led sanitation proﬁling and enumerations (sur-
veys). The second phase included sanitation precedents
designed to demonstrate sanitation solutions oﬀering the
potential for scaling up. The third phase, concluding in
September 2015, sought to strengthen city federations’ work
with the local authorities and move toward city-wide sanita-
tion strategies.
SDI is a well-documented (Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2014, pp.
159–172) international network that grew out of experiences
of the Alliance in Mumbai, and learned from the Orangi Pilot
Project. Community exchanges spread the Indian Alliance’s
organizing methods and strategies to South Africa in the early
1990s. Subsequently this process linked with other existing ini-
tiatives, catalyzing new federations of shelter-poor urban dwell-
ers and their support NGOs, which formed their own Alliances.
The formal network was launched in 1996, and has grown from
the six founding members (South Africa, India, Namibia, Cam-
bodia, Nepal, and Thailand) to over 30 aﬃliates.
The core form of organization within the slum/shack/home-
less people’s federations that constitute SDI is the savings
scheme: local groups that draw together residents (mainly
women) in low-income neighborhoods to save, share their
resources and jointly address their collective needs. These local
groups and the larger federations to which they belong engage
in many community-driven initiatives to collect data, link to
other grassroots groups and social movements, build relations
with local authorities, upgrade informal and squatter settle-
ments, improve tenure security and oﬀer residents new devel-
opment opportunities. Table 1 summarizes the level and
duration of federation activity in the four cities involved in
the FCSP.
SDI Alliances would seem to be well placed to address the
sanitation challenges that are the subject of this article.
Community organization and solidarity are central to the
SDI approach, which should provide a strong basis for collec-
tive action. The Alliances work to develop collaborative
relationships with local authorities, and to avoid relations of
dependence, making coproduction a natural approach.
Aﬀordability has not only been a major concern in relation
to the struggle for better housing, but being organized around
savings groups SDI federations are in a good position to
address the challenges of negotiating aﬀordability. Finally,
with the struggle for land and housing also central to their
mission, they are well versed in tenure-related challenges.
Unfortunately, in most of urban Africa, low-cost sanitary
facilities are still dominated by pit latrines that are treated as
Table 1. Federation activity in Blantyre, Chinhoyi, Dar es Salaam and Kitwe
Blantyre Chinhoyi Dar Kitwe
Date federation began organizing in the city 2004 2003 2004–05 2008
Settlements in which the federation is active 42 5 62 38
Number of savers (early 2015) 600 2300 4300 1200
Proportion of savers as proportion of informal settlement population 0.5% 32.7% 0.7% 3.6%
Source: Project documents.
314 WORLD DEVELOPMENTprivate goods that, if they are oﬃcially allowed at all, residents
should build and manage without government subsidies.
Private latrines can have public beneﬁts, and from an economic
perspective are not strictly private goods. But local authorities
are reluctant to devote public resources to providing private
latrines in informal settlements. This reluctance is ampliﬁed
when the authorities are concerned that excessive rural–urban
migration into informal settlements is part of the problem,
and do not want to subsidize such settlement. High levels of ren-
tal accommodation are also commonplace, complicating resi-
dents’ ability to secure sanitation improvements.
Even before the FCSP, the SDI Alliances in each of the four
cities were working on sanitation, and had identiﬁed a range of
technological and institutional options suitable to diﬀerent
urban densities, groundwater levels and soil types, tenure
types, and regulatory frameworks. What the project provided
was the chance to develop a more systematic approach to san-
itation upgrading, to work toward city-wide sanitation strate-
gies that could be supported by local governments, and to
learn from these eﬀorts.
As the following sub-sections illustrate, considerable pro-
gress was made over the project’s three years. Nevertheless,
the numbers reached only range between 200 and 2,500 house-
holds across the four cities. The challenges remain daunting,
and the period of experimentation and learning by doing is
by no means over.
(a) SDI Alliances in the four cities and the collective action
challenge
Independent of the collective action challenge of sanitation,
the collective organization in communities is nurtured by SDI.
Aﬃliates recognize that collective action for sanitation can
improve local well-being and provide an organizing base for
the urban poor, ensuring ongoing collective practice and sup-
porting the capability of the movement for autonomous
action. Such practical social organizing is believed to prevent
the weakening of collective identity, which is a risk when
movements advance their common goals and interests primar-
ily through lobbying politicians. From this perspective, SDI’s
broader strategy for community-driven urban upgrading suits
the collective action challenge sanitation poses.
A ﬁrst step in the FCSP was collecting data about sanitation
conditions in selected informal settlements, mapping out the
houses and documenting their sanitary facilities. Within SDI’s
organizing methodologies, enumeration and mapping are seen
as essential for agreeing settlement-wide priorities, instigating
savings practices and strengthening positive relations with
local authorities. Collecting the information on sanitation
from every household provided the opportunity to mobilize
households not already part of the savings groups. There
was no explicit attempt to use the mapping exercise to trigger
collective action to improve sanitation, as there is with CLTS
mapping (Kar, 2008). However, enumeration exercises did
help to build a collective intention to address sanitation prob-
lems, and the data collection was used to mobilize residents.Prior to FCSP, most Alliance eﬀorts had focused on
household latrines provided within private plots (often for
the landowner and tenants). Unfortunately, there is less scope
for facilitating local collective action with private pit latrines
than with the simpliﬁed sewers of the Orangi Pilot Project or
the community block latrines of the Indian Alliance. Private
pit latrines may have collective consequences, but do not lend
themselves to community construction and maintenance.
Moreover, private latrines allow facilities to be built to suit
each household’s budget, which keeps costs aﬀordable, but
can undermine the creation of social norms and standards,
and in eﬀect undermine collective action.
In all of the cities, the opportunities for collective responses
were explored. Over the course of the FCSP, federation mem-
bers and NGO staﬀ shared experiences of community blocks
developed elsewhere including those by the Indian Alliance,
the Uganda Alliance (in Jinja and Kampala) and the Zim-
babwe Alliance (in Harare). Precedents in both Chinhoyi
and Blantyre included community toilet blocks, with several
in Blantyre also serving markets. Simpliﬁed sewers were
extended in Dar es Salaam with links to government collection
ponds. In Blantyre, a sanitation project undertaken by the
Alliance on a greenﬁeld site provided an example of simpliﬁed
waste water treatment technology. Community leaders were
keen to build on this experience. However, diﬃculties ﬁnding
the land to ﬁt such systems into Blantyre’s informal settle-
ments made their replication diﬃcult.
In Dar es Salaam where pit latrines are particularly com-
mon, one of the precedents chosen by the Alliance involved
latrine emptying. While latrine emptying does not usually
involve collective action, federation women were trained in
using a ‘‘gulper” to empty the latrines and assisted in ﬁnancing
the purchase of a motorized tricycle and trailer to carry the
sludge away (for a review of pit emptying technologies includ-
ing the gulper see Still & Foxon, 2012). The intention has been
to embed these emptying operations within local community
organizations, helping to turn the toilet-emptying into a
community-led operation.
(b) SDI Alliances in the four cities and the coproduction
challenge
Like the Indian Alliance described above, SDI Alliances in
the four cities are committed to coproduction, and collaborat-
ing with local authorities. However, unlike in India, none of
the four Alliances are working with governments willing to
fund the construction of on-site sanitation facilities or commit
to the regular removal of fecal sludge from the settlements.
Also unlike India, there were no budgets in place that the Alli-
ances could draw on as precedents emerged. Part of this reluc-
tance to ﬁnance sanitation probably lies in the lower national
incomes and the low shares of this income going to govern-
ment, though other contextual diﬀerences matter.
What makes coproduction particularly important is that
while the communities are often best placed to develop and
manage low-cost facilities in their settlements, they are not
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and process it safely, or to pay for private services. Ecological
sanitation is an exception, in that the fecal sludge is treated on
site. This may explain why ecological sanitation has been
attractive to the Alliances, and why several have gone out of
their way to get local authorities to remove regulations pro-
hibiting ecological sanitation. A further motivation is the fre-
quency with which water supplies are interrupted and the need
for alternatives to water-borne sanitation. As described under
the aﬀordability challenge, however, ecological sanitation is
costly, and when applied to communal toilet blocks the behav-
ioral changes required to make the technology eﬀective have
been demanding, limiting its applicability.
In Kitwe, the local Alliance tried to develop a coproduction
relationship with the local utility, which had a donor project
under the National Urban Water and Sanitation Program.
The total project budget of $63 million had less than 10% for
‘‘Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion and Education”, which
included a component for about 1,000 latrines in Kitwe. Each
latrine was to cost about US$ 1,000 and was to be provided
to recipient households for free. The local Alliance pointed
out that that the true costs were unaﬀordable to the estimated
33,000 households without adequate sanitation, and that pro-
viding this small share of households with free toilets would
make it more diﬃcult to provide aﬀordable toilets at scale, using
loans and realistic levels of government support. The engaged
staﬀ at the utility agreed that lower cost alternatives needed to
be developed, but explained that the terms of the grant could
not be changed. Delays persisted indeﬁnitely in the face of the
need to redesign the project. The ultimate eﬀect was to under-
mine both local collective action and coproduction.
Local authorities have engaged with the activities in the four
cities, but in an ad-hoc fashion. In Blantyre the local authority
provided land for neighborhood toilet blocks, allowing the
income to be retained by the neighborhood. In Chinhoyi,
reconstruction of an existing council toilet block and the trans-
fer of management to local residents who are council tenants
has been permitted and the income is being used to capitalize
a revolving fund. In Dar, the authorities allowed the contents
of the simpliﬁed sewer to drain into the wastewater treatment
for a charge, and have oﬀered to co-fund extensions to this
network.
While this support is signiﬁcant to the Alliances, it cannot
easily be scaled to provide city-wide sanitation coverage across
most informal settlements. In Chinhoyi and part of Dar es
Salaam there is acknowledgment of co-dependency in the
development of sanitation solutions. In the former it is being
catalyzed by the crisis in local government ﬁnancing in
Zimbabwe, and in the latter by increasing attention to urban
water and sanitation in national policy discussions. What is
lacking is either support for models where local authorities
take responsibility for components of the sanitation (such as
the removal and treatment of the sludge away from the settle-
ment) or models that combine private and public resources
eﬀectively enough to achieve scale.
(c) SDI Alliances in the four cities and the aﬀordability
challenge
The aﬀordability challenge in many low-income African
cities is acute, and has two faces. First, it is rarely possible
to ﬁnd sanitation solutions that are at once acceptable and
aﬀordable: acceptable to either the users or their governments,
and aﬀordable given the combined resources users and their
governments feel they are able to devote to improving sanita-
tion. This reﬂects technical diﬃculties, a lack of investment indeveloping low-cost technologies, and the low priority individ-
ual users and their governments give to sanitation. But it also
reﬂects the unacceptable poverty many people live in. It is
unreasonable to expect those living on unacceptably low
incomes to aﬀord acceptable sanitation. This relates to the sec-
ond face of the aﬀordability challenge: when low-income resi-
dents do agree on an aﬀordable sanitation improvement, they
risk the double indignity of agreeing to devote their scarce
resources to improved facilities that they cannot really aﬀord,
only to have authorities tell them these facilities are not up to
standard.
Reﬂections from Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Uganda
suggested that if SDI aﬃliates wish to reach signiﬁcant num-
bers of lower income families they have to bring the monthly
household costs of sanitation down to USD 3–4 (Banana
et al., 2015). SDI Alliances have three main strategies to
reduce the cost of sanitation. The ﬁrst is the use of savings
and loan funds to spread the cost of capital investments.
Households are typically expected to collect some building
materials prior to beginning construction, and use loan capital
if savings are not suﬃcient. Local groups who prepare applica-
tions to Federation loan funds are required to analyze house-
hold income and expenditures to assess aﬀordability. It is
generally accepted that loan repayments for capital invest-
ments should be completed in 2–3 years. For the loan funds
in the three Alliances charging interest of 1% a month, the
loan has to be between $50 and $120. The second strategy is
innovation to reduce the size of the capital investment. The
third is to build political pressure to secure ﬁnance and (if
required) regulatory reform to legalize new approaches.
Working without state subsidies, some groups may be able
to negotiate support for local improvements, but it is extre-
mely diﬃcult to bring costs down to this level of aﬀordability.
As illustrated in Table 2, few of the precedents have come
close. Forms of collective toilet provision and/or waste man-
agement (either shared or communal) help to reduce costs,
but are diﬃcult for either residents or local authorities to
accept. The shared toilet blocks for council tenants in Chin-
hoyi come closest. The aﬀordability challenge is also evident
in the fact that the models where funds seemed most likely
to come from the government—improved pit toilets in Kitwe
and the expansion of the simpliﬁed sewers in Dar es Sal-
aam—are also those that cost the most. The demonstration
toilets in Kitwe are not in the table as they were never built,
while the costs of the simpliﬁed sewers in Dar es Salaam are
likely to be considerably higher away from the water treatment
plant that is adjacent to the settlement where the precedent is
located. Even for those within the vicinity they are being asked
to pay $1.5 a month per toilet to the utility to drain the waste
into the plant.
(d) SDI Alliances in the four cities and the housing tenure
challenge
The aﬃliates in three of the cities have to deal with a situa-
tion in which a majority of those living in informal settlements
are renting accommodation. This creates diﬃculties for low-
cost sanitation improvement, as tenants and owners often
have conﬂicting interests that can be diﬃcult to negotiate
away. Other diﬃculties arise when the shelter owners’ rights
to the land are disputed, and there are risks that residents will
have relocate with little or no compensation.
Given the insecurity of most tenancies in informal settlements,
tenants rarely invest in constructing more than rudimentary
private toilets. If landlords are considering building a toilet for
their tenants, they and their tenants have very diﬀerent concerns.








Blantyre Household eco-san 279 23–27 Household provide materials; total cost of $333. Facilities and
costs shared with tenants
Blantyre Toilet block (eco-san) 24,000 50.4 Cost of six family members using facilities four times daily
Chinhoyi Household eco-san 310–350 18 Limited sharing of facilities.
Chinhoyi Household sewered toilets 480 20 Some sharing of facilities between home owners and tenants.
Includes water charges
Chinhoyi Communal block 9,000 3 Recently been built and operational experiences now underway
Dar es Salaam Pour ﬂush 270–623 13–30 Landlord pays; some costs may be passed on to tenants
Dar es Salaam Household eco-san 270–623 13–30 Landlord pays; some costs may be passed onto tenants
Dar es Salaam Gulper 15–35 N/A This is the cost of pit emptying. May be paid by landlord or all
Dar es Salaam DEWATS 300–400 To be determined New technology and costs being assessed
Kitwe Household eco-san 188 11 Costs est. at $266; households provide some of their own
materials
Kitwe Septic tank 547 14–22 This was intended to be shared investments but this was not
possible because too few households wanted this option
Source: Draft project document (minor revisions possible).
Notes to table:
a This is the capital repayment only. There are operational and maintenance costs in addition.
b Loans are used in all four cities. In Blantyre this is 4% a month for a year. In all other cases loans are for two years at 1% a month.
316 WORLD DEVELOPMENTTenants fear that improvements to sanitation services will
increase rents by more than they can aﬀord, and many recall
having to leave accommodation in the middle of the night due
to unaﬀordable rent arrears. Landlords fear that they will not
be able to recoup the costs or that tenants will not maintain
the facilities. The response of Alliances has been to seek agree-
ments from the landlords to keep any increases to a minimum,
starting with discussion within the federation, where both land-
lords and tenants are usually represented (Stephen, 2012). In the
medium term, aﬃliates hope to institutionalize agreements that
delay rent increases for a number of years. In the longer term,
aﬃliates recognize they need to develop greater expertise with
informal settlement upgrading, including around issues of
tenure. The Kenyan Alliance, whose members came to share
their experiences at a recent meeting of the FCSP, have been
making headway with a combined ‘‘Campaign for Sanitation
Land and Justice”, which has used sanitation as an entry point
for negotiating tenure issues, including justice for tenants
(Sverdlik & Mbaka, 2015).
Land tenure issues are also evident in the diﬃculties that the
Malawi Alliance faced in replicating the decentralized waste
water treatment technology in informal settlements. This is
both because they cannot secure land for the treatment pond
and the plots need to be reconﬁgured for straight lines to
enable the installation of sewers.5. CONCLUSIONS
The examples of OPP in Karachi and the Indian Alliance in
Pune and Mumbai conﬁrm many of the arguments made by
McGranahan (2015): that in deprived urban settings a key
to sanitary improvement lies in meeting the institutional chal-
lenges posed by the need for local collective action, coproduc-
tion, aﬀordability and housing security. However, the
examples from the FCSP illustrate how diﬃcult it can be to
overcome these obstacles, particularly in the short-term and
with a primary focus on low-cost on-site facilities. While social
innovation was central OPP’s and the Alliance’s approaches,
this innovation was tightly bound up with technologies—the
simpliﬁed sewers for OPP and the communal toilet bocks for
the Indian Alliance. These did not just provide sanitation ata low cost, but provided traction for users to collaborate with
each other, coproduce improvements with the local authority,
work together to drive down costs, and work to improve hous-
ing security. This was facilitated by the existence of state bud-
gets that could be used to support this work: How the funds
were spent had to be amended but idea that sanitation was a
public rather than private good was already established. Only
time will tell whether the more promising precedents set during
the FCSP will develop into scalable models equivalent to those
developed by OPP and the Alliance, but the challenges still
look formidable.
Over time, following demonstrated residents’ collaboration
and demand for their solution, both the OPP and the Indian
Alliance were successful in securing the kinds of political sup-
port required to scale up these eﬀorts. In neither case was this
support immediately forthcoming. In both cases coproduction
developed incrementally and iteratively as initial explorations
convinced doubters and helped to secure and consolidate sup-
port among both politicians and oﬃcials. This resulted in the
deepening and widening of the initiative. Senior ﬁgures
acknowledge the importance of the political momentum that
developed, and the way it engaged both elites and local politi-
cians. In terms of the scaling of these initiatives beyond the city
in which they developed, there are varied experiences. In India,
lower densities enable more options and have led to alternative
solutions being developed for other urban centers. In Pakistan,
initial attempts at replication struggled in part due to the diﬃ-
culties of establishing initiatives in context that lacked the gra-
dient of Orangi. These have been overcome with time with
further technical innovations and supported by the evident suc-
cess achieved by the approach in Karachi, and the approach
has now been accepted in national policy (Pervaiz et al., 2008).
In all of the four African cities it has proved hard to identify a
technology which, when implemented by new collective social
practices, enables success at scale. Each of the challenges
remains important and addressing them is work in progress.
Eﬀorts have been made to develop collective action, strengthen
collaboration with the state (and encourage coproduction),
improve aﬀordability and improve tenure security (or, in the
case of tenants, manage within the constraints of limited secu-
rity). However, without more state ﬁnance it is diﬃcult to scale
any of the initiatives discussed, and without more attractive
LEARNING FROM SUSTAINED SUCCESS 317low-cost options it is diﬃcult to attract more ﬁnance or generate
pressure from below. It may be possible to develop more
promising systems around simpliﬁed sewers (possibly with more
decentralized wastewater treatment), some form of community
or shared latrines, and/or community-organized pit-latrine emp-
tying, but to date none of these has provided the same traction
for collective action and coproduction as has been achieved inMumbai, Pune and Karachi. These outcomes suggest the need
to continue work in this area. On the one hand, existing solu-
tions need to be tested and modiﬁed to work better in
constrained circumstances. On the other, experiences to date
point to the need to think ‘‘outside the box”—something which
characterized the early days of sanitation work in both Karachi
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